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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter, 
a second degree felony, and from an order denying appellant's motion 
for a new trial. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3<2)(f) (Supp. 1988). 
The District Court entered its judgment on January 12f 1989. 
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on January 18, 
1989, which was denied by the trial court on February 8f 1989. 
Appellant filed her timely notice of appeal on March 3, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the District Court erred in a bench trial in denying 
appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of 
the State's case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense. 
2. Whether the District Court's verdict of manslaughter was 
against the clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self-defense 
as the evidence did not establish the absence of self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's 
motion for a new trial based on an erroneous and unsupported conclu-
sion that there was a cessation in hostilities sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense. 
4. Whether the District Court's order of restitution was legal. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 30, 1988, appellant was found guilty by the District 
Court, sitting without a jury, of manslaughter. Appellant was also 
found not guilty of second degree murder. On January 9, 1989, the 
District Court sentenced her to a term of imprisonment of not less 
than one yearf nor more than 15 years. The District Court further 
ordered her to pay restitution to the decedent's family (her in-laws) 
in an amount to be set by the Board of Pardons at the time of release. 
On January 18, 1989, appellant filed a motion for a new trial, suppor-
ted by an affidavit, based on certain findings made by the District 
Court at the time it rendered its verdict. On February 8, 1989, the 
District Court denied appellant's motion for a new trial. This appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The State's Case-in-Chief; 
On the evening of July 8, 1988, in Tooele County, Sandy 
Magana heard someone crying, looked out the window of her condominium 
and saw Kay Strieby, the Appellant, sobbing hysterically. Mrs. Strieby 
came to Ms. Magana's door and asked her to call the paramedics because 
Chris Strieby, the decedent, had been shot. Mrs. Strieby told 
Ms. Magana that she shot the decedent because he was beating her and 
would not stop, but "just kept coming." (Tr. 126-32.) 
In response to Ms. Magana's call received by Tooele County 
Dispatch, Deputy Lynn Bush went to the Striebys1 condominium in 
Stansbury Park. Deputy Bush found the decedent lying on the landing 
midway up the stairway leading to the second floor of the condo-
minium. A hat and a blue plastic cup were also on the landing and a 
gun was lying on a night stand in an upstairs bedroom. (Tr. 15-26.) 
Deputy Bush observed that Mrs. Strieby had numerous bruises on her 
face, including a swollen eye, a swollen lip and a mark on her fore-
head. She was also extremely upset. (Tr. 38-42.) 
Detective Alan James and Sheriff Don Proctor took a taped 
statement from Mrs. Strieby following the shooting as she sat in the 
sherifffs car at the scene. Mrs. Strieby told Detective James and 
Sheriff Proctor that she and the decedent had been arguing since the 
previous day. On the morning of July 8f she got up early in order to 
be at work in Grantsville by 6:00 a.m. After work, she went home, did 
some housework and then went to the Strieby welding shop in Tooele to 
talk with the decedent. They arguedf and the decedent told Mrs. Strieby 
she "was a cunt and not to come around him anymore ...". He gave her 
the "finger," and she left and drove to the Eagle's, a private club in 
Tooele, where she talked with friends and had a few drinks. She then 
returned to the Strieby welding trailer to pick up the decedent. She 
and the decedent argued again and the argument ended with him knocking 
The condominium stairway has one flight of stairs from the entryway 
up to the landing, a 180° turn at the landing, and a second flight of 
stairs from the landing up to the second floor. (Tr. 22.) 
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her down. Mrs. Strieby then called her friendf Charlotte Gourley, who 
2 
came and took her home. (Ex. 14 at 2, 7-8.) 
Don McCord, the decedent's best friend, was at Strieby 
Welding drinking with the decedent on the day in question. According 
to McCord, the decedent had lied to Mrs. Strieby about spending the 
night with another woman. While the couple often argued, the argument 
that afternoon seemed more intense on the decedent's part, as well as 
Mrs. Strieby's. Mr. McCord testified that he and the decedent had 
been drinking all day and that the decedent had already drunk approxi-
mately two-thirds of a fifth of vodka when Mrs. Strieby returned to 
the trailer that afternoon. By that time, he and the decedent were 
drinking from a fresh half gallon of vodka. After Mrs. Strieby left, 
McCord and the decedent continued to drink their half gallon. (Tr. 
68-71, 81-85.) 
When Mrs. Strieby got home, she lay down to rest for a few 
minutes. When the decedent's nephew, Joey Gruenwald, and his friend, 
both of whom were staying at the condominium temporarily, came home, 
Mrs. Strieby asked them to drive to the trailer and bring the decedent 
home "before he gets too drunk." (Ex. 14 at 2.) Joey Gruenwald and 
his friend went to the trailer and found the decedent still drinking. 
They told him that they "wanted to drive him home because [they] 
didn't want him driving home drunk either." They finally convinced 
Exhibit 14 is a transcript of appellant's taped statement to 
Detective James and Sheriff Proctor. 
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him to go with them. They dropped him off outside the condominium and 
left for Salt Lake City without going inside. (Tr. 107-113.) 
As soon as the boys left, the decedent entered the condo-
minium and immediately began yelling obscenities at Mrs. Striebyf 
grabbing her and threatening to kill her. As Mrs. Strieby told 
Detective James: 
I opened the door and the kids left and he just, 
just started hitting me and started calling me 
names and saying I did things I didn't.... [Hie 
said, "I'll kill ya." He said, "I'll beat you to 
death. No wonder your first husband beat you. 
You're a mouthy bitch." 
Mrs. Strieby repeatedly pleaded with the decedent to leave her alone, 
and also asked him to give her a few days and she would move out. But 
he refused: 
[Hie said, "I ain't giving you no time at all." 
. . . I said, "Chris you can't be like this," and 
he said he'd kill me, he'd beat me to death. He 
said, "If the beatin' you thought you got at dad's 
trailer was bad today, you wait until I get ahold 
of you again." 
(Ex. 14 at 3, 4, 8.) 
Mrs. Strieby pulled away from the decedent's grasp and ran 
away from him up the stairs. The decedent grabbed Mrs. Strieby by the 
leg and dragged her down the stairs on her back and neck. Mrs. Strieby 
again asked the decedent "please ... just leave me alone, I just, give 
me a couple a days," but the decedent was "grabbing" and "shaking" 
her, so she struggled free and ran upstairs. (Ex. 14 at 4; Tr. 163.) 
Although Mrs. Strieby was too shaken to recall exactly how she got the 
decedent's gun from their bedroom closet. She had it when he came at 
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her up the stairs. She begged him to quit beating her. The decedent 
kept coming: 
He said. . . . "I'll kill you before you can pull 
the trigger." He told me to go in and pull the 
trigger. He could knock me down four times before 
I could pull the trigger. There wasn't enough 
dust to bury him.... 
(Ex. 14 at 4, 8.) Mrs. Strieby again pleaded with the decedent not to 
hit her again. He told her to "Pull the trigger you fucking bitch, 
cause it ain't loaded and I can make it up the stairs before you pull 
it anyway." (Ex. 14 at 8.) As the decedent came charging up the 
second flight of stairs from the landing, he again told her that he 
was going to kill her and she fired one shot which killed him. 
Mrs. Strieby recalled that "I don't really remember pulling the 
trigger, God Almighty. It hurt my arm, it threw my arm clear back and 
I am so, oh God Almighty ... it was horrible. It was terrible. I, oh 
my neck is sore, my back is sore. He really whopped me a good one in 
the neck and my neck is really sore but I didn't mean to hurt him...." 
(Ex. 14 at 5, 8; Tr. 25.) After her arrest, Mrs. Strieby was taken to 
the emergency room at the local hospital for treatment for the neck 
and back injuries sustained during the beating. 
Dr. Edward Sweeney, the state medical examiner who examined 
the body, testified that the decedent was a "heavyset man" weighing 
about 200 pounds with a "muscular development." The cause of death 
was a gunshot wound. Consistent with Mrs. Strieby's statement, the 
path of the bullet was a downward angle, with the bullet entering the 
decedent's mouth and coming to rest at the back of his neck. The 
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decedent's alcohol level was .25 milligrams percent, or approximately 
three times the legal limit for the State of Utah. Dr. Sweeney testi-
fied that alcohol affects the highest levels first - those "that 
separate man from animal." Dr. Sweeney also testified that the 
decedent's self-control and judgment would clearly have been affected 
at his .25 blood alcohol level and his coordination and reflexes would 
also have been affected. (Tr. 117-121.) 
At the conclusion of the government's case, appellant's 
counsel argued that the State had not met its burden of proof on the 
critical element of self-defense. Counsel pointed out that overwhelm-
ing evidence of self-defense had been introduced in the State's case 
and there had been no evidence to overcome the State's heavy burden to 
prove that appellant did not act in self-defense. (Tr. 298-304.) The 
government responded that appellant's voluntary statement to the 
sheriff was the only evidence it had of what occurred at the Strieby 
house on the night in question. (Tr. 313-314.) The District Court 
denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on both second 
degree murder and manslaughter without explanation. 
2. The Defense Case: 
Appellant testified in her own defense and elaborated on and 
expanded her voluntary statement to Detective James and Sheriff 
Proctor. In April of 1988f after having known each other for several 
years and having previously lived together, Mrs. Strieby and the 
decedent were married. At the time of the marriage, the decedent was 
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estranged from, and had no contact with, his father and brothers, A 
few months later, he began spending time with his family again. Since 
that time, in the two months immediately prior to July 8, the decedent 
became emotionally upset due to his family problems. He began drink-
ing excessively and became very short-tempered. (Tr. 218-226.) 
On July 7, 1988, the decedent was angry because they had not 
had sex for some time, and he blamed Mrs. Strieby. He told her that 
if he did not get sex from her soon he would "go someplace else for 
it." Mrs. Strieby told him that his excessive drinking was the cause 
of the problem, as he was unable to maintain an erection when drunk. 
She told the decedent that if he drank less they probably could have 
sex. Mrs. Strieby then went upstairs to bed. Approximately twenty 
minutes later, the decedent followed her upstairs, slapped her in the 
face with his penis and demanded sex. Mrs. Strieby asked him to leave 
her alone. The decedent then "jumped on" Mrs. Strieby and attempted 
to have intercourse with her "from behind". The decedent eventually 
went back downstairs and slept on the couch. (Tr. 229-230.) 
The following morning, July 8, 1988, Mrs. Strieby got up 
early and went to her job as a seamstress in Grantsville. On Fridays, 
she only worked until 10:00 a.m., so she returned home at that time 
and did some light housework and began preparing dinner. After some 
time, she drove to the Strieby welding shop where she and the decedent 
argued again. She then spent some time at the Eagle"s, returning to 
the Strieby welding trailer in the late afternoon. Mrs. Strieby 
intended to pick up the decedent and take him home, but they argued, 
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so she left him the keys and had Charlotte Gourley drive her home. 
(Tr. 231-238.) 
When the decedent, who was drunk, came home, he immediately 
attacked Mrs. Strieby. The decedent was substantially bigger and 
stronger than Mrs. Strieby. Although they had argued before, he had 
never before attacked her as he did that night. He had also never 
before threatened to kill her. Mrs. Strieby testified that "the door 
flew open" and the attack began. He began beating her and calling her 
names. When Mrs. Strieby asked for some time to get out, he told her 
she "didn't have any time." Although she tried to open and escape 
through the front door, the decedent slammed it shut. He told her 
that "two other women had left him, and the only way [she] could leave 
was on a stretcher." (Tr. 240-241.) 
As she fought off the decedent's attack in the entryway, 
Mrs. Strieby ran up the stairs to the landing. The decedent grabbed 
her and pulled her back down the stairs by her legs. As she was 
pulled down the steps, she hit her head on the landing and stairs. 
Mrs. Strieby had broken her back before and had a long history of 
serious back injuries, including four prior back surgeries. To 
protect herself, she said she "put my hands up and tried to double my 
body up so I would — I was scared because of my back, and I was 
scared because of my head. I didn't know if I had hurt my head bad. 
He just wouldn't leave me alone." (Tr. 241-244.) 
Throughout the attack, the decedent told Mrs. Strieby that 
he was going to kill her. She testified: 
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I had never seen him like this. I had never seen 
his eyes — I had never seen his face contorted to 
the point where he was completely uncontrollablef 
where he — I couldn't talk to him. He just kept 
saying, "I am going to kill youf you bitch. I am 
going to kill you, you bitch. You don't deserve 
to live." And he just — he wouldn't stop.... But 
all this time he was telling me he was going to 
kill me. And he told me — just screaming things 
at me. Just screaming ... He was screaming 
obscenities, and things that — sometimes he 
didn't even make sense. [She became] so scared of 
him I knew that he was going to kill me. And he 
said he was going to kill me. 
(Tr. 241-243.) 
As the decedent struck out at Mrs. Strieby, she ran up the 
stairs again. When he came after her, she pleaded with him to "leave 
[her] alone." He told her "I'm going to kill you, you bitch. You've 
just embarrassed me enough, and I am going to kill you." Mrs. Strieby 
testified that "he just — he kept coming up the stairs. He just kept 
coming. And he kept screaming at me that he could get me before I 
could shoot him...." As the decedent continued up the stairs in 
pursuit of her, Mrs. Strieby fired one shot from his gun, killing him. 
(Tr. 245-246.) 
Mrs. Strieby was taken to the Tooele Valley Hospital emer-
gency room where she was examined by Dr. Mark Anderson for her neck 
pain and other injuries. At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that based 
on Mrs. Strieby's pain and the numbness in her hands, he initially 
thought that Mrs. Strieby had suffered either a broken neck or a 
ruptured cervical disk. Dr. Anderson stated that four prior back 
surgeries is an "extremely unusual" number and Mrs. Strieby's range of 
motion in her back and neck was generally less than half of normal. 
In addition, Mrs. Strieby had bruises on various parts of her bodyf 
including bruises that were in the shape of fingers, "a classic 
description of somebody being grabbed with the fingers very hard." 
She also had multiple abrasions, a swollen left eye and a tender area 
on her neck. (Tr. 194-201.) 
Dr. Anderson testified that Mrs. Striebyfs injuries were 
consistent with being dragged down stairs on her neck and back, and 
with trying to escape an attack. Dr. Anderson further testified that 
being dragged down stairs on one's neck and back could certainly have 
caused death or serious bodily injury. In fact, Dr. Anderson stated 
that because of Mrs. Strieby's back problems and prior surgeries, 
serious bodily injury was more likely for her. For someone in her 
condition, Dr. Anderson testified, being dragged down the stairs could 
have caused paralysis or death. (Tr. 203-204.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court, at a bench trial, erred in not granting 
appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of 
the State's case-in-chief. At that point in the trial, the issue of 
self-defense had been raised and the State completely failed to prove 
that appellant did not act in self-defense. 
2. The District Court's verdict of manslaughter was against the 
clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self-defense. Not only 
did the State fail to prove in its case that appellant did not act in 
self-defense, but evidence presented by the defense created further 
reasonable doubt. 
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3. The District Court erred in not granting appellant's motion 
for a new trial, as its sole theory to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant did not act in self-defense was not based on a scin-
tilla of evidence but was simply a speculative leap across the State's 
gap in the evidence. 
4. The District Court's order of restitution was procedurally 
and substantially illegal because no reasons for the order were given 
and because restitution cannot be ordered for collateral loss to 
persons arguably collaterally injured by an offender's conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL. 
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, appellant made a 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the government had 
failed to meet its burden of proof. Specifically/ appellant argued 
that the State failed to prove in its own case, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense. 
In reviewing the District Court's verdict, it is important to 
emphasize that appellant was tried at a bench trial. The Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly established that a more probing and less deferential 
standard of review is to be applied in a bench trial, as compared to a 
jury trial. As the Court noted in State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1988): 
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When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency 
of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's 
judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made." . . . [Tlhis standard 
accords "appropriate recognition of the relative 
deference owed multi-member panels as opposed to 
single-judge findings." Under this less deferential 
standard, the likelihood that a defendant's convic-
tion will be reversed following a bench trial, as 
opposed to a jury trial, is increased. . . . 
[Tlhis standard requires that the clear weight of 
the evidence presented at trial not be contrary to 
the verdict. . . . Even if the clear weight of 
the evidence supports the verdict, however, this 
Court will reverse if it otherwise reaches a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, thus providing the defendant an additional 
opportunity to obtain a reversal. 
. . . In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency 
of the evidence, we require that the weight of the 
evidence, discounting questions of credibility and 
demeanor, not oppose the verdict. Hence, a defen-
dant's conviction must still be based on evidence 
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, 
on appeal, the standard of review aids the defen-
dant in his efforts to obtain a reversal. . . . 
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
By contrast, as this Court has noted, in a jury trial: 
[Tlhe standard for reversal is high. "We reverse 
... only when the evidence ... is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reason-
able minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime...." 
. . . Furthermore, all evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom must be reviewed in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. . . . 
State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Even in review-
ing a jury trial, this Court has noted that: 
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Although this is a high standard, it is not 
insurmountable. We will not make "speculative 
leapfs] across ... remaining gapfs]" in the 
evidence. . . . Every element of the crime 
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If the evidence does not support those elements, 
the verdict must fail. 
Id. at 568. 
Applying those principles to the instant case, the State had the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, by competent evidence, 
that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense. In that regard. State 
v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) is controlling. Therein, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, although the absence of self-defense is not 
one of the prima facie elements of homicide, once the issue is raised, 
it is the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant did not act in self-defense: 
[A] defendant is not required to establish a 
defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
or even by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . 
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence, 
whether the evidence is produced by the prosecu-
tion or by the defendant, which would provide some 
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a 
killing was done to protect the defendant from an 
imminent threat of death by another, an instruc-
tion on self-defense should be given the jury. 
And if the issue is raised, whether by the 
defendant's or by the prosecution's evidence, the 
prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-
defense. 
Id. at 214 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The only evidence presented by the government on what happened 
during the decedent's assault on Mrs. Strieby came from the taped 
statement of Mrs. Strieby. In the absence of any other evidence, much 
less any conflicting evidence, the statement itself clearly created a 
reasonable doubt on the issue of self-defense on which the State had 
1 A 
the entire burden of proof. Most importantly, a finding at the end of 
the government's case that a reasonable doubt did not exist on that 
issue is overwhelmingly against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Indeed, no evidence existed on that issue other than Mrs. Strieby's 
statement. 
In the absence of any evidence to support its case, the govern-
ment completely failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue of 
self-defense. It did not offer any evidence whatsoever in its case to 
establish that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense. To the 
contrary, Mrs. Strieby's statement and the testimony of Dr. Sweeney 
offered strong evidentiary support for self-defense. For example, 
Dr. Sweeney testified that, due to the decedent's blood alcohol level 
of .25, his judgment and self-control would have been seriously 
impaired. This testimony fully corroborated Mrs. Strieby's statement 
regarding the decedent's uncharacteristic rage, refusal to quit beat-
ing her and repeated threats to kill her when he got ahold of her. In 
short, the only evidence presented was that of a 200 pound muscular, 
burly man in a wild, drunken state, more of an animal than a man, 
driven to seriously injure or kill his wife. The District Court's 
denial of appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneous 
3 
and against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The District Court's error was compounded by its failure to grant 
even a partial acquittal on second degree murder. As a result of this 
error, appellant was placed in the position of being strategically 
forced to present evidence in her behalf. Had the District Court 
granted her motion, even in part, appellant's range of decisions and 
choices would have been substantially broader including, e.g., to have 
remained silent at trial. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL 
COURTfS VERDICT OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
At the end of the bench trial, the District Court rendered a 
verdict of manslaughter. This verdict is against the clear weight of 
the evidence. At the conclusion of its case-in-chief, the State had 
failed entirely to present any evidence conflicting with Mrs. Strieby's 
account of self-defense as set forth in her statement/ much less prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt/ as required/ that she did not act in self-
defense. Moreover/ Mrs. Striebyfs defense further bolstered her claim 
and created even more doubt. 
In her own defense/ Mrs. Strieby offered additional strong 
evidence of self-defense. Her trial testimony gave further detail 
regarding the decedent's relentless assault and his repeated threats 
to take her life on that night. Mrs. Strieby testified that she had 
never before seen such a crazed look in the decedent' eyesr nor had he 
ever perpetrated such a savage attack upon her or threatened to kill 
her. Mrs. Strieby further testified that/ in the course of the battle/ 
she attempted to escape by running upstairs but that the decedent 
dragged her down the stairs on her neck and back. Because of a 
previous broken back and subsequent back surgeries/ this alone could 
have caused serious bodily injury or death to Mrs. Strieby. In fact/ 
it did cause serious bodily injury to her as reflected in the testi-
mony of Dr. Mark Anderson who confirmed the extent and serious nature 
of injuries inflicted on Mrs. Strieby by the decedent. Dr. Anderson 
explained how the decedent's beating of Mrs. Striebyf andf specific-
ally/ how dragging her down stairs on her back and neckf caused her 
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serious bodily injury and could easily have caused her death* In sum, 
the clear weight of the evidence at trial established that Mrs* Strieby 
shot the decedent in self-defense to protect herself from serious 
bodily injury or death. But, even more importantly, the evidence 
clearly did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not 
act in self-defense. 
In reviewing the verdict at a bench trial, this Court must "dis-
count questions of credibility and demeanor". State v. Goodman, supra, 
4 763 P.2d at 787. In this case, however, even that requirement is not 
significant since the District Court credited Mrs. Strieby's testimony. 
Specifically, in the course of delivering its verdict of manslaughter, 
the District Court acknowledged that there were no substantial con-
flicts in the evidence. (Tr. 319.) The District Court further stated 
that it had "no substantial reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version." 
(Tr. 321.) In fact, the District Court specifically found that the 
decedent had resumed beating Mrs. Strieby upon arriving home and 
further indicated that it had "no substantial doubt about the reality" 
of her fear for her life, given the decedent's "powerful muscular 
build." (Tr. 323.) 
Notwithstanding the clear and unrebutted evidence indicating that 
Mrs. Strieby acted in self-defense, the District Court found that her 
That does not mean that this Court cannot, in appropriate circum-
stances, evaluate a witness' testimony. For example, in State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction in a bench trial when it found a key witness' testimony 
unreliable. Walker at 197-198. In the instant case, the District 
Court credited appellant's testimony which makes the verdict even more 
erroneous. 
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shooting of the decedent was not legally justifiable. Under the appli-
cable , less deferential standard of review, it is clear that the 
District Courtfs verdict must be reversed as against the clear weight 
of the evidence. The evidence presented by both the prosecution and 
the defense established self-defense. Most importantly, the State 
offered no evidence which even remotely indicated that Mrs. Strieby 
did not act in self-defense and, thus, it completely failed to prove 
the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. This is 
precisely the kind of case, under Goodman, where less deference is 
owed to a "single-judge" finding. Therefore, the District Court's 
verdict of manslaughter must be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Following entry of the judgment of conviction, Mrs. Strieby filed 
a motion for a new trial. This motion was in response to the District 
Court's improbable, and totally hypothetical, theory concerning the 
blue plastic cup found on the landing near the decedent's body — 
raised for the first time by the Court in announcing its decision. In 
delivering its verdict, the District Court hypothesized that the dece-
dent — in the midst of his violent, drunken and ruthless attack on 
Mrs. Strieby — stopped and "went into the kitchen and poured himself 
a drink," and that, with drink in hand, he then followed Mrs. Strieby 
upstairs. This conclusion by the District Court is not supported by a 
scintilla of evidence. There was absolutely no evidence that the dece-
dent fixed himself a drink during the heat of the assault on his wife, 
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nor any evidence presented by the State th5?*- +\. iecedent did not 
bring the cup with him from the trailer where he had been drinking 
vodka a 11 day » 
Mrs. Strieby's affidavit, submitted in support of her 
motion, establishes that there was in fact no hard liquor in the condo-
minium. In its search o- n<* scene
 f the T'ooe] e County Sheri ff s 
Department failed to locate any alcohol or evidence of alcohol., with 
the exception of < • -TTT*L " beer can. (Ex. B, attached 1; o Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for -*w Trial.) In factr the officers observed 
that the condominium wa. clean and well-kept. (Tr. 2:4) Signifi-
c a n. 11 y , a 11 h o u g h < - • o p p o r f:: u n i t y a n d ::> b ] :i g a t i o i : , t o 
Mrs. Strieby's affidavit, the State offered nothing to refute it, The 
District Court's theory on the blue plastic cup is thus entirely with-
out evidentiary support. 
The District Court relied on its illogical and unsupported theory 
to make a bootst .rap finding that there was a "reasonable, substantial 
cessatior* n he attack on Mrs. Strieby, so that the decedent was not 
nin vigorous, hot pursuit" at the time she ran up the stairs and got 
the qun - On this basis,, i t found her gu i 1 ty of mansljuqhtei (Tr 
324-326.) 
The District Courtlc? conclusion unsupported by any evidence, was 
c 1 e a i d 111, :l p r e j u d I c i a I < * .: : - - J 
of "speculative leapfs] across remaining gapts]* in rre evidence 
condemned by this Court. State v. Harman, supra * ,2d at 568, quot-
ing from State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445 (U* ^ -;s. Strieby 
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was entitled to a new trial, and the District Court erred in denying 
her motion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURTfS ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION WAS ILLEGAL. 
At the time of sentencing, the District Court ordered appellant 
to pay restitution in an amount to be fixed and assessed by the Board 
of Pardons at the time of her release. (Tr. 343.) The State argued 
that Mrs. Strieby should be required to pay full restitution for 
funeral and related expenses, as well as for therapy for the decedent's 
daughter. Counsel for Mrs. Strieby argued that restitution was 
improper because appellant was impecunious and unable to obtain gain-
ful employment because of her back injuriesf so that she had no 
ability to pay restitution. (Tr. 334-336.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1989) governs the imposition of 
restitution in criminal cases. It sets forth particular factors to be 
considered by the Court and specific procedures to be followed by the 
Court, including the requirement that "Iwlhether the court determines 
that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make 
the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." § 76-3-201 
(3)(a)(i). The District Court's failure to consider the stated criteria 
and to set forth in the record its reasons for ordering restitution, 
as mandated by the statute, is clear error. On this procedural basis 
alone, the District Court's order of restitution is illegal. 
More importantly, the order of restitution is illegal because 
Mrs. Strieby has no ability to pay. This Court has held that fines 
and restitution are generally disfavored for defendants who lack the 
ability to pay. 
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State v, Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (1984) Furthermore, one cannot be 
imprisoned for d&bt or for contempt •- li one does not have Hie 
ability to pav See Utah Constitution, Article I § 16; Harris v. 
Harris, 377 P.2d 100? (Utah 1963). 
In add I 11 on , t he o r de t \•> i t es111 u 11 \>n i s i I 1 ega I hec:ause 11. 
requires restitution to individuals who are not "victims." Section 
76-3-201 (4) (d) defines a "victim" as a person who has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities* 
Pecuniary damages are further defined as special damages which could 
b e r e c o v e r e d a g a I n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i i I a • :: i i * :i 1 a c t i o n, s u c h a s ff 11 i e 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise 
harmed, and losses such as earnings and medical expenses." These are 
direct consequences of thi s • ::ase, the i:esti-
tution sought is not for pecuniary harm to the decedent. It is also 
not for any property damage or similar losses directly attributable to 
Mrs. Striebyfs actions. Rather, the restitution sought is for 
collateral consequences to individuals arguably collaterally injured. 
Theiapy for the decedent's daughter is simply not tiip type u-f direct 
pecuniary damage contemplated by the statute. See People v. Catron, 
678 P.2d 1 (Ct- App, Colo, 1984) I "victim" refets to the party immedi-
ately ai: id ill rect; J y aqgi, leved by the criin.in-M *n*' • and not to others 
who suffer loss because of some relationship, contractual or other-
wise, to the directly aggrieved party), Although "victim" is broadly 
defined, the 1:erIII npecun :i ar y damages,n s11: i c11 y cons11: ued •. =;quI r ed 
in a criminal case, is limited to payment of direct damages to the 
di rect v:i cti ms of an offender f s conduct. 
For these reasons, the District Courtfs order of restitution was 
illegal. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellantfs conviction must be reversed/ orf in the alter-
native
 f the case should be remanded for a new trial, and the order of 
restitution should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of August/ 1989. 
CLYDE/ PRATT & SNOW 
NEJC, 4. KAPLA1 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed/ postage prepaid/ to the 
following this 3rd day of August/ 1989: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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76-3*201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under 
Chapter 30, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental ex-
pense from one county to another within the state for the purpose of 
resolving pending criminal charges, and is adjudged guilty of crimi-
nal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court 
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
ate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision 
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of 
restitution to the Division of Finance. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
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(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Vic-
tim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activi-
ties. 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentenc-
ing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judi-
cial Council. 
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment 
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no 
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre-
scribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall 
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate 
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